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THE JUDGE WHO ABSTAINED IN
PLESSY v. FERGUSON: JUSTICE DAVID
BREWER AND THE PROBLEM OF RACE
J. Gordon Hylton*
The final line of the United States Supreme Court opinion
in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson states, "Mr. Justice
Brewer did not hear the argument or participate in the decision
of this case."' Because of the untimely death of his daughter, the
58-year old Justice had been forced to leave Washington, D.C.
for his home in Leavenworth, Kansas, on April 13, 1896, the day
Plessy was argued before the Court.2 Without Brewer, the Court
voted 7 to 1 to uphold Louisiana's "separate but equal" public
accommodations law. Only Justice John Marshall Harlan, a for-
mer slaveholder from Kentucky, agreed that the challenged
"Jim Crow" statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guar-
* Visiting Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. Ph.D.,
Harvard University, 1986; J.D., University of Virginia, 1977; A.B., Oberlin College, 1974.
Research for this paper was supported by the Marshall-Ewell Fund of the Illinois Insti-
tute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author would like to thank Frank
Lorson, Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, for making available
materials on the October 1895 term of the Supreme Court and Professor Chandos Brown
of the College of William and Mary, and Professor Charles McCurdy of the University of
Virginia, and the members of the Chicago-area American Legal History discussion group
for their comments on earlier versions of this essay. Barbara Pintozzi, Carol Merritello,
and Nitan Dater of IIT-Chicago Kent provided valuable research assistance.
163 U.S. 537, 564 (1896). On Plessy v. Ferguson generally, see C. VANN WOODWARD,
The Case of the Louisiana Traveler, QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION
145-58 (J. Garraty ed. 1964) and C. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION (1987).
Francis Adele Brewer died of tuberculosis in Texas where she and her mother had
moved the previous year in hope that the climate would improve her health. Wasington
Post, April 14, 1896 at 3; see also, H. KARRICK, DAVID JOSIAH BREWER: A BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH By His DAUGHTER (1912) (available at Yale University Library in collection of
Brewer Family Papers). Because of his involvement with an international commission
appointed to resolve a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guinea, it is
possible that Brewer would have missed the argument anyway. See infra note 103.
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antee of equal protection of the laws.'
A general familiarity with the personal background and con-
stitutional views of David Josiah Brewer might have led one to
believe that had the Kansan been present, he would have joined
in Harlan as a second vote against the challenged ordinance.
The son of an abolitionist clergyman, Brewer had enlisted in the
cause of antislavery as a youth, and in 1858, at age 21, had
joined the migration of antislavery New Englanders to "Bloody
Kansas."' 4 As a judge in Reconstruction era Kansas, he had au-
thored one of the first judicial opinions upholding the right of an
African-American citizen to vote in a general election, and as the
superintendent of schools in Leavenworth, he had helped estab-
lish the first schools for blacks in the state. Furthermore, since
joining the United States Supreme Court in 1890, he had been a
vocal supporter of African-American advancement in his pro-
nouncements off the bench. In an 1892 address to the American
Home Missionary Society, for example, Brewer had proclaimed,
"This is not an Anglo-Saxon, not a Teutonic, not even a Cauca-
' Harlan's eloquent defense of the civil rights of African-Americans in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries is one of the best known chapters in the history of
the United States Supreme Court. It is ironic that on a court composed largely of
northerners who either participated in or came of age during the American Civil War the
one clear voice in favor of a racially egalitarian society was that of a former Kentucky
slaveholder who, before his appointment to the nation's highest tribunal, had opposed
the ratification of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. For a discussion of
Harlan's views on race and civil rights, see Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Con-
stitutional Rights of Negroes, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957).
There is, unfortunately, no biography of Brewer. This absence is explained in large
part by the failure of Brewer to leave behind any substantial body of private papers. The
existing Brewer papers are collected in the Brewer Family Papers, Yale University Li-
brary, New Haven, Connecticut. A small collection of his papers (64 items) can also be
found in the Library of Congress. Unless otherwise noted, biographical information in
this article is derived from materials in the Brewer Family Papers.
There are many secondary sources which address various aspects of Brewer's career.
See, e.g., Bergan, Mr. Justice Brewer: Perspective of a Century, 25 ALB. L. REV. 191
(1961); R. CUSHMAN, 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 22 (D. Malone ed. 1928);
Eitzen, David Brewer, 1837-1910: A Kansan on the United States Supreme Court, 12
THE EMPORIA STATE RESEARCH STUDIES 1 (1964); 0. Fiss, David J. Brewer: The Judge as
Missionary, in THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 53-63 (1986); Gamer, Justice Brewer and Sub-
stantive Due Process: A Conservative Court Revisited, 18 VAND. L. REV. 615 (1965); A.
PAUL, 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1967, AT 1515 (L.
Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969); L. Lardner, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice
David Josiah Brewer (1938) (unpublished Princeton University Ph.D. dissertation).
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sian nation. The blood of all races mingles in that of the Ameri-
can people."'
Moreover, Brewer had exhibited great sympathy for other
"minority" groups. He was the Court's foremost spokesman for
the rights of Asians residing in the United States, siding with
the Oriental party in eighteen of twenty-three cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court during his tenure. (The Court
itself found for the Oriental party in only six of these cases.7 ) He
was also a supporter of women's rights, at least as the term was
' Address of Mr. Justice Brewer, MINUTES OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE AMEkICAN HOME MISSIONARY SOCIETY 95 (1892).
See Tang Tun v. Edsell, 214 U.S. 523 (1909); Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 209
U.S. 453 (1908); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908); Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198
U.S. 500 (1905); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); United States v. Sing
Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904); Tom Hong v. United States, 193 U.S. 517 (1904); Ah How v.
United States, 193 U.S. 65 (1905); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903);
Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193 (1902); Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168
(1902); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902); United States v. Lee Yen
Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901); United States v.
Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 156 (1900); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Lem
Wong King Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893); Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); In re Lau Ow Bew, 141 U.S. 583 (1891); Wan Shing v.
United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891); Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891).
Brewer did not participate in Wang Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). In three
additional decisions, the Court did not issue written opinions but instead disposed of the
cases by summary affirmance or dismissal. See Goon Shung v. United States, 212 U.S.
566 (1909); Chinese Cases, 165 U.S. 275 (1897); Chinese Cases, 140 U.S. 676 (1891).
At the time of the Plessy argument, Brewer had sided with the Asian position in six
of seven cases. In four of these cases, he was in dissent.
7 See In re Lau Ow Bew, 141 U.S. at 583; Lau Ow Ben, 144 U.S. at 47; Gue Lin, 176
U.S. at 156; Tom Hong, 193 U.S. at 517; Chin Yow, 208 U.S. at 8; and Liu Hop Fong, 209
U.S. at 453. Brewer sided with the Oriental party in 78.3% of the cases in which the
court issued a written opinion. Of his colleagues on the Court between 1890 and 1910,
only Rufus Peckham consistently supported Brewer's position, doing so in 76.5% of the
cases in which he participated (13 of 17). No other Justice's percentage exceeded 50.0%,
although Stephen Field did support the Oriental position in 4 of 8 cases. Chief Justice
Melville Fuller most perfectly represented the Court's sentiment, voting in the majority
in all 24 cases decided in this twenty year period (six times favoring the Chinese/Japa-
nese position and eighteen times opposing it). Harlan, on the other hand, was slightly
less sympathetic to this position than the court as a whole, supporting the Oriental posi-
tion in only 5 of 23 cases (21.7%). The records of Brewer's other contemporaries on the
court are as follows: Bradley, 2 of 5; Gray, 4 of 11; Blatchford, 2 of 6; Lamar 2 of 5;
Brown, 5 of 22; Shiras, 2 of 11; Jackson 0 of 1; White, 4 of 17; McKenna, 3 of 15; Holmes,
2 of 8; Day 3 of 8; and Moody, 1 of 2. Neither Justices Miller or Lurton participated in
such a case during the brief time they sat with Justice Brewer.
1991]
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understood in his era. As a judge in Kansas in the 1870's, he had
supported the right of women to hold property in their own
names and had upheld their right to serve as school supervisors.8
While a member of the Supreme Court, he publicly supported
women's suffrage and called for an increased role for women in
the professions.9 In a 1905 speech at Vassar College, Brewer en-
dorsed the idea of a woman President and suggested that social
worker Jane Addams would make an excellent mayor of Chi-
cago.10 Moreover, in one of his best known Supreme Court opin-
ions, Muller v. Oregon," he departed from his long-standing op-
position to legislative interference in the labor market to uphold
the constitutionality of protective legislation for women workers.
Brewer was also an outspoken supporter of a variety of what
were in his era viewed as "liberal" causes. He was a life-long
advocate of world peace and a crusader for the cause of interna-
tional arbitration.'2 ie served for years as an officer of the
American Missionary Association; he was an active supporter of
the Associated Charities in Washington, D.C., and he was a de-
vout member of the Congregational Church.' 3 In the late 1890's
he would emerge as an outspoken opponent of United States im-
perialism, a critic of the war with Spain, and an advocate of im-
mediate independence for the Philippines."'
Furthermore, of all the men who sat on the United States
Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, none was more vocal than Brewer, both on and off the
bench, in his support of the cause of individual liberty. He be-
S H. KARRICK, supra note 2, at 24.
' Women's Suffrage: Its Present Position and Its Future, 30 THE LADIES WORLD 6
(1909). See generally, J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RE-
SPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 221 (1978).
10 Address by Justice Brewer to Vassar College on Women, Changed Relations to
Life and Society (1893) (available at Yale University Library in collection of Brewer
Family Papers). See also, Women in the Professions, THE DELINEATOR (May 1906).
" 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
" For Brewer's efforts on behalf of international cooperation, see Butler, Melville
Weston Fuller-David Josiah Brewer, Memorial Note, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 909 (1910).
" Brewer was involved in both charitable and liberal "causes." See, e.g., R.
CUSHMAN, supra note 4, at 23; K. MORTON, DAVID JOSIAH BREWER (1912) (available at
Yale University Library in collection of Brewer Family Papers).
" Brewer, The Spanish War: A Prophecy or an Exception, in 16 KANSAS COL-
LECTED SPEECHES AND PAMPHLETS 16-17 (n.d.).
[VOL. 61
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lieved that liberty of contract was a right protected by the Con-
stitution; he favored a narrow interpretation of the state police
power; and he rejected the concept of a paternalistic state.
These positions seemingly clashed with the efforts at social engi-
neering that lay behind the emerging regime of legally-mandated
segregation that was emerging in the American South at the end
of the nineteenth century.15 Brewer was also not reluctant to
stake out a position at odds with that of his colleagues. He was
the greatest dissenter of his era, breaking with the majority on
226 occasions during his twenty years on the court.16 He dis-
sented, on average, 11.3 times per term, a rate greater than any
of his colleagues, including Harlan, the so-called great dis-
senter.17 Furthermore, Brewer did not limit his remarks to the
Court's official utterances. His private papers contain the texts
of more than 100 public orations and magazine articles com-
posed while on the Court.18 He was, according to the Virginia
Law Register (a legal journal for the practicing bar), a justice
who "mingled with the people and addressed his countrymen
• ..upon matters concerning the general welfare," and who "did
not hesitate to express vigorous opinion upon all the great ques-
tions of the day and with vigorous rhetoric . . . lashed the
See infra notes 75-98.
10 A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUD-
IES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 144 (1978). Brewer wrote dissenting
opinions in 57 of the 226 cases in which he dissented. He also wrote the majority opinion
in 533 cases, 70 of which involved constitutional issues. He also concurred in 44 majority
opinions, writing separate opinions in 8 of them. Cushman provides slightly different
figures, i.e., 526 majority opinions, 38 concurrences including 8 separate opinions, 215
dissents, and 53 dissenting opinions including 18 which dealt with constitutional issues.
R. CUSHMAN, SUPRA note 4, at 24,
17 Harlan dissented, on average, in 11.1 cases per term. Of the other seventeen jus-
tices whose terms on the Court overlapped with Brewer, only Rufus Peckham (10.9) and
Edward White (10.7) averaged more than 10 dissents per term. Samuel Blatchford dis-
sented with the least frequency, averaging less than one dissent (0.7) per term during his
eleven year career. See A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 16, at 148.
"S The Brewer Family Papers contain approximately eighty public addresses and
nearly fifty articles, the vast majority of which were written during his two decades on
the Supreme Court. K. MORTON, INTRODUCTION TO BREWER FAMILY PAPERS 2 (1912)
(available at Yale University Library in collection of Brewer Family Papers). A six-page
list of Brewer's extracurricular writings while on the Court, many of which were origi-
nally delivered as public orations, can be found in L. Lardner, supra note 4, at 226-31.
1991]
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abuses of legal processes and the chicanery of lawyers."19
In spite of all the reasons that might lead one to expect
Brewer to be sympathetic to the claims of African-American citi-
zens, his voting record in civil rights cases hardly justifies such a
conclusion. During his twenty year tenure, the Supreme Court
handed down decisions in thirty cases involving the civil rights
of African-Americans.2 0 Not surprisingly, the defenders of Afri-
can-American rights and liberties were generally unsuccessful,
prevailing in only five of the thirty cases.2 1 Brewer participated
19 16 VA. L. REGISTER 65 (1910). Brewer's penchant for publicly voicing his disagree-
ments with his colleagues was not always appreciated by his brethren on the bench. Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who served with Brewer from 1902 to 1910, observed that while
Brewer "was a very pleasant man in private," he "had the itch for public speaking and
writing and made me shudder many times. I have heard him speak in public with a
curious bitterness about some of the decisions of his brethren that he disagreed with." 1
HOLMES-POLLACK LETTERS 160 (M. Howe ed. 1941). In the same letter, written shortly
after Brewer's death, Holmes also noted, "I had to remind myself that one should not
allow taste to blind one to great qualities, as it is apt to." Id. Mr. Dooley, the popular
creation of Finley Peter Dunne, was also less than enamored with Brewer's proclivity
toward public speaking, although he did at least acknowledge his prominence. See
Dunne, College and Degrees-Justice at Yale, in MR. DOOLEY AND THE CHOICE OF LAW
52-57 (1963).
20 See Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); United States v. Shipp (II), 214 U.S.
386 (1909); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452
(1908); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); United States v. Shipp (I), 203
U.S. 563 (1906); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S.
217 (1906); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547 (1905); Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207 (1905); Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904); Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146
(1904); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 528 (1903);
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426 (1903);
Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903); Cummings v. County Board of Education, 185
U.S. 528 (1903); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896); Charley Smith v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895); Andrews v. Swartz,
156 U.S. 651 (1895); In re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291 (1891); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278
(1891); Louisville, New Orleans, & Texas Ry v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
2 See United States v. Shipp, (II), 214 U.S. 386 (1909); United States v. Shipp, (I),
203 U.S. 563 (1906); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547 (1905); Rogers v. Alabama,
192 U.S. 276 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900). One could argue that black
Americans gained little from these decisions. Carter, Rogers, and Shipp (I) dealt with
the right of an African-American criminal defendant to present evidence that blacks had
been systematically excluded from the jury that had convicted him. In each, the decision
of the Court was unanimous. In Shipp (II), which addressed the power of federal courts
to hold members of lynch mobs and compliant law enforcement officials in contempt of
court, a six-judge majority (including Brewer) affirmed the existence of such power. The
[VOL. 61
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in twenty-nine of these cases, and in only six did he side with
the African-American position.2" On only one occasion did he do
so in dissent."3 Nor was Brewer a quiet participant in the actions
three dissenters (Edward White, Rufus Peckham, and Joseph McKenna) differed only as
to the issue of the power of the federal court to hold a sheriff and his deputies in con-
tempt for their failure or unwillingness to stop the mob. Riggins dealt with the power of
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for white members of lynch mobs who had
been arrested by federal authorities. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that this
was an improper remedy.
2 As the following breakdown of judicial voting in these cases illustrates, with the
exception of Harlan and Day, Brewer's contemporaries exhibited little sympathy for
such claims.
Individual Voting, United States Supreme Court Decisions Involving African-American
Civil Rights, 1890-1910






































Note: The above percentages are distorted somewhat by the fact that four of the five
pro-civil rights decisions were handed down between 1904 and 1909. There is little rea-
son to believe that any of these cases would have been decided differently had they
arisen between 1890 and 1904. The percentages for only five justices-Harlan, Day,
Brown, Brewer, and Bradley-exceeded that for the Court as a whole during their years
on the Supreme Court.
S Brewer's dissenting opinion came in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). His five
other pro-African-American votes came in the five cases cited in note 21. Of course, dis-
sents in such cases were extremely rare. Other than Brewer, only four justices ever dis-
sented on behalf of unsuccessful civil rights claimants during Brewer's tenure. Harlan
dissented in nine cases: Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908); Berea College v. Ken-
tucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. (1906); Clyatt v. United
States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); Giles v. Teasley, 198 U.S. 146 (1904); James v. Bowman, 190
19911
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of the Fuller Court majority. In seven of the twenty-five cases in
which African-American civil rights claims were rejected, Brewer
adthored the majority opinion.2" Perhaps the most telling fact of
all is that Harlan was willing to concur in only one of Brewer's
seven majority opinions. '
From the vantage point of the late twentieth century,
Brewer's votes in these cases make him appear highly inconsis-
tent, if not hypocritical. On the one hand, he was able to incor-
porate a special concern for the civil rights of Chinese into his
constitutional views, even though such a view put him at odds
with most of his colleagues and with prevailing popular opinion.
On the other, he seemed unable to develop a comparable view of
the rights of African-Americans, even though his off-the-court
activities suggested that he would be sympathetic to such a view
and even though his friend and colleague Harlan had paved the
way for a position years before Brewer joined the Court.2
Brewer's apparent inability to square his general beliefs with his
votes as a Supreme Court Justice is evidence of the intractable
nature of the problem posed by the institutionalization of racial
segregation in turn-of-the-century America. To fully understand
the accommodation that Brewer finally worked out, one has to
begin with his pre-Civil War experiences as a son of the Greater
New England culture.
U.S. 127 (1903); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 407 (1903); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896); Louisville, New Orleans, & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 597 (1890). He was
joined by William Day in three of these cases: Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1
(1906); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Bailey v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 528
(1903). He was joined by Henry Brown in two: Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903);
James v Alabama, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). He was joined by Joseph Bradley in Louisville,
New Orleans, & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
" See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1 (1906); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S.
147 (1904); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903); and Louisville, New Orleans &
Texas Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
2" The one case was Jones v: Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) (discussed at length in
text accompanying note 126). In Tarrance, Harlan did not attend the oral argument and
did not take part in the decision of the case. In the other five cases, he dissented.
"6 Westin, supra note 3 at 638. Harlan had first taken this position in his dissent in
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
[VOL. 61
HeinOnline  -- 61 Miss. L.J. 322 1991
JUSTICE BREWER
DAVID BREWER AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1837-1890
Although he spent his entire adult life in Kansas and Wash-
ington, D.C., Brewer was a product of the reform-oriented cul-
ture of antebellum New England. His father, Josiah Brewer
(1796-1872), was a Congregationalist minister who had been ed-
ucated at Phillips Academy, Yale, and Andover Theological
Seminary and who had, in the late 1820's, undertaken an educa-
tional mission to Smyrna, Asia Minor. It was there, on June 20,
1837, that David Josiah Brewer was born. Brewer's mother, Emi-
lia Ann Field Brewer, was a member of one of the most illustri-
ous families in America. Her father was the Reverend David
Dudley Field, Sr. Her brothers included David Dudley, Jr., the
author of the Field Code and one of the premier American law-
yers of his era; Cyrus, the entrepreneur who laid the Atlantic
cable, Henry, a noted clergyman, editor, and author, and Ste-
phen, who would rise to prominence as a member of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court and, after 1864, as a justice on the United
States Supreme Court. In fact, Stephen was living with the
Brewers in Smyrna at the time of David's birth, and 53 years
later they were to be reunited as colleagues on the Supreme
Court.
A cholera epidemic and a decline in financial support for
their mission forced the Brewers to return to Connecticut in
1838, at which point the elder Brewer accepted a position as a
prison chaplain that he was to hold until 1841. Josiah Brewer's
ministry took him from one Connecticut town to another over
the next fifteen years, during which time he became an active
crusader for a variety of liberal causes including prison reform,
pacifism, and, most importantly, anti-slavery. Although little is
known of David Brewer's early life, he was apparently pro-
foundly influenced by his father's strict Congregationalism and
his support for social reform. In his later life, Brewer would reg-
ularly speak with pride about his New England reform heritage,
on one occasion stating, "I glory in the fact that my father was
an old-line abolitionist, and one thing which he instilled into my
youthful soul was the conviction that liberty, personal and polit-
ical, is the God-given right of every individual, and I expect to
1991]
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live and die in that faith. 27
In 1852, the fifteen-year-old Brewer enrolled in Wesleyan
College in Middletown, Connecticut. Two years later, he trans-
ferred to Yale, his father's alma mater. In 1856, he graduated
with honors, ranking fourth in a class of ninety-seven which in-
cluded Henry B. Brown, another future colleague on the United
States Supreme Court. He then spent a year clerking in the New
York City law office of his uncle, David Dudley Field, after
which he enrolled in the Albany Law School.
It was during this period of law study that Brewer himself
publicly embraced the cause of anti-slavery. In a letter to a Mas-
sachusetts newspaper, the Middlesex Republican, in early 1857,
he denounced the outgoing administration of President Franklin
Pierce as "a failure and a curse to the country" and blamed
Pierce personally for the ongoing civil war in Kansas between
pro and anti-slavery forces. In regard to his fellow New En-
glander-Pierce was from New Hampshire-he wrote: "Never in
our annals has there been presented a sadder picture of imbecil-
ity, spurred on by overriding ambition. '2 8
A subsequent edition of the paper carried a letter from a
reader criticizing the intemperance of Brewer's remarks, but the
editor defended Brewer's actions. Ironically, the same issue of
the paper also carried a story announcing the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Dred Scott v Sandford."9 In a follow up
letter, Brewer ignored his critic and instead attacked the contro-
versial Supreme Court opinion, referring to it as "that last great
satire on Constitutional logic." Although he criticized the
Court's majority for deciding the case on broader grounds than
were necessary, the central focus of his attack was Chief Justice
Taney's assertion that African-Americans were not citizens of
the United States and never had been. Brewer wrote:
Without commenting on the injustice of this striking out from
the rolls of citizenship, so large a body of our fellow citizens,
27 Brewer, The Spanish War: A Prophecy or an Exception, in 16 KANSAS COL-
LECTED SPEECHES AND PAMPHLETS 16-17 (n.d.) quoted in Eitzen, supra note 4, at 53-54.
28 Middlesex Republican (undated clipping included in Brewer scrapbook in collec-
tion of Brewer Family Papers).
2" 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 469 (1857).
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whose ancestors shared with ours the trials and honors of the
Revolution, we assert that the Constitution was framed to se-
cure the blessings of freedom and citizenship to all who wished
them, and though its authors were compelled to bend a little to
peculiar interests, they laid the foundation and bade America
prepare for universal citizenship.30
Other contributions to the Middlesex Republican by Brewer in-
cluded a letter that argued on behalf of the United States Con-
gress' power to prohibit slavery in the territories and a lengthy
anti-slavery poem, entitled "Dred Scott.""1
In the spring of 1858, Brewer received his law degree and
was admitted to the New York bar. At this point, he made a
decision that would shape his future career. Rather than return
to New York City to practice law with his already famous uncle,
David Dudley Field, the twenty-one year old Brewer decided to
follow the example of his uncle Stephen and move west, specifi-
cally to Kansas. 2 His motives appear to have been a combina-
tion of youthful idealism and the desire to secure fame and for-
tune in a new land. He departed for Kansas City in 1858,
arriving at the peak of the hostilities between pro-slavery and
anti-slavery Kansans. Shortly thereafter, Brewer left Kansas
City on a prospecting expedition to Colorado in search of gold.
When the venture failed, he returned to the East. His visit was
brief, however, and in the fall of 1859, he returned to Kansas
and settled in Leavenworth, a city that would be his home until
his appointment to the United States Supreme Court thirty
'o See E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE 417-48 (1978).
" These items are available at Yale University Library in Justice Brewer's scrap-
book included in the collection of Brewer Family Papers. Brewer's scrapbook from this
period of his life reflects an intense interest in poetry. Many of its pages are given over to
clippings of poems written by others. Page one of the scrapbook includes two poems by
Longfellow, one by Bryant, one by Poe ("Annabel Lee"), the Lord's Prayer, and an arti-
cle on Kansas. The Middlesex Republican also published "Evening at Nahant," a non-
political poem by Brewer.
"2 The exact reasons for Brewer's decision to relocate to Kansas are not known.
Later in life, Brewer claimed that he decided to forego practice in New York City for
fear he would always be known as the nephew of David Dudley Field. Family rumor had
it, however, that David Dudley Field was unimpressed by Brewer's prospects for success
in the law in New York and encouraged him to seek his fortune in the West. L. Lardner,
supra note 4, at 53.
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years later.
The attention of the young Brewer had been focused on
Kansas for some time. His scrapbook, begun in 1856, contains a
newspaper story on Republican William Seward's "Bill for the
Admission of Kansas into the Union" on its first page, and nu-
merous other articles on Kansas, collected between 1856 and
1859, are included. As his sister later recalled, "We should have
been surprised when David decided to go west, had he thought
of elsewhere than in Kansas. '33 Throughout his life, Brewer cele-
brated the early anti-slavery efforts in his adopted state, com-
paring John Brown to John the Baptist and designating Brown
as the forerunner of Abraham Lincoln. " Although his sympa-
thies were clearly with the anti-slavery forces, the subsiding of
hostilities at the end of 1859 allowed him to avoid most of the
violence of "Bleeding Kansas" and to concentrate instead on the
more mundane task of establishing a law practice.
In spite of his education and prestigious family, Brewer's in-
itial efforts in Leavenworth met with very limited success. When
a sufficient number of clients failed to materialize, he turned to
public service, filling a variety of governmental positions in his
early years in Leavenworth. Initially a notary public, he was ap-
pointed commissioner of the Federal Circuit Court in Leaven-
worth in 1861 and was later elected judge of the county probate
court. In 1865, he was elected judge of the first judicial district
of Kansas, and the same year assumed the position as Superin-
tendent of Schools for the city of Leavenworth. His only politi-
cal setback came in 1863 when he failed to obtain the Republi-
can nomination for a seat in the state legislature.
It was in Kansas in the late 1860's that Brewer first dealt
directly with the issue of the African-American citizenship, a
concept that he had whole-heartedly endorsed in his pre-Civil
War attack on the Dred Scott decision. Shortly after his election
to the district court bench, he was required to interpret Section
1, Article V of the Kansas Constitution which limited the right
to vote to white males. In Morris v. McHale, Rapine, and Har-
13 H. KARRICK, supra note 2, at 57.
34 Brewer, Some Thoughts About Kansas, in TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BAR
ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 61 (1895).
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ris,3 5 John Morris, a thirty-seven year old male whose father was
white and whose mother was three-quarters black, had at-
tempted to register to vote but had been barred from doing so
by local officials because of his race. In a decision that struck a
blow for racial egalitarianism, Brewer ruled that Morris did in-
deed have the right to vote. Brewer rested his holding upon a
series of propositions. First, he held, "the theory of our govern-
ment is universal [manhood] suffrage." Second, laws are pre-
sumed to be "humane and just" unless convincing evidence ex-
ists that the legislature intended the contrary. (Implicit in this
proposition was the view that to deny someone the vote would
be inhumane and unjust.) Finally, Brewer noted that the Kansas
Constitution referred to race, not color, and that Morris was
more of the white race than the black.
Brewer did not, however, claim that the provision in the
state constitution was invalid. Given that the Fourteenth
Amendment (and possibly the Thirteenth as well-the exact
date of the case is not recorded) had not yet been adopted, it is
hard to see how he could have, even if he had so desired. Conse-
quently, he did acknowledge that individuals of undiluted Afri-
can heritage were not entitled to vote under the Kansas
Constitution.
Brewer's early years in Leavenworth may also have been the
first time in his life that he had the opportunity to interact with
African-Americans on a regular basis. By all accounts his per-
sonal relations with his black neighbors were warm and heart-
felt, although his attitude toward them seems highly paternalis-
tic. He embraced the cause of African-American education
shortly after his arrival in Kansas, but his affectionate descrip-
tion of black pupils as "juvenile Ethiopians" suggests that he
thought of Leavenworth's African-Americans as something less
than social equals. 6 The nature of Brewer's attitude can be
" This case is unpublished but an unidentified newspaper report of the case is con-
tained in Justice Brewer's scrapbook, No. 2, p. 10 in the Brewer Family Papers. The case
was apparently decided in 1865, but prior to the ratification of the thirteenth amend-
ment; at least, there is no reference of the amendment in the newspaper report of the
case.
's SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF LEAVEN-
WORTH CITY, KANSAS 18 (1866) [hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT].
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gleaned from a story related by Arthur Simmons, a white cigar
maker in Leavenworth. Harking back to the late 1870's when
Brewer was a Kansas judge, Simmons recalled:
One day Justice Brewer was in the store, talking to me, when
an old negro came in, who had been janitor at the court house
ten years before, when Brewer was District Judge. Neither the
Justice nor the negro recognized the other. The negro bought a
bit of smoking tobacco, and started shuffling out.
Then I told Brewer who he was. "What!" he exclaimed, "Is
that Uncle Ebe? Heavens, how he has aged!" Then he went
over and stopped the old man. "Uncle Ebe," he said, "don't
you recognize me?" The negro looked at him blankly for a sec-
ond, then his face became positively radiant.
'Fo de Lord, it's Marse David!" he exclaimed, and reached out
his two hands and took those of Brewer. Then Justice Brewer
stood there shaking hands with him and recalling old times in
the court house for I don't know how long.37
Brewer's most direct and most significant involvement with
the African-American population of Leavenworth came in his
capacity as Superintendent of Public Schools in Leavenworth.
He had become involved with public education shortly after his
arrival in Kansas, and in May of 1864, he was chosen as vice
president of the local board of education. In this capacity he was
instrumental in the establishment of the first two public schools
for African-Americans in Leavenworth (which were apparently
the first such schools in the state.)38 In November of 1864, he
assumed the office of president of the board and in August of
1865, he became superintendent of schools, a position he held
until 1868 when he was elected president of the state teachers
17 H. KARRICK, supra note 2, at 57.
38 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 14. Brewer claimed that the Leaven-
worth schools were the first public schools for African-Americans in Kansas in a public
address delivered shortly after the turn-of-the-century. See infra note 171. Other evi-
dence seems to support this claim. Working with H. D. McCarty, another of the pioneers
of public education in Kansas, Brewer helped secure $25,000 for the construction of pub-
lic school buildings for both races in Leavenworth. C. WRIGHT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS IN
KANSAS EDUCATION 18 (1963). Of Brewer's colleague McCarty, the historian of public
education in Kansas has written, "with equal enthusiasm, he promoted Negro education
in the established schools of Kansas." Id.
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association." As superintendent, he proudly reported on the
progress of the "colored" schools, including the establishment of
a third school during the 1865-66 school year. In 1867, he noted
with approval that virtually all of the city's African-American
children under age sixteen had attended school for at least part
of the year.4"
There is no evidence, however, that Brewer believed that
black and white children should be educated in the same
schools. Although the "General Regulations of the Schools" in
force during the years 1865 to 1868 made no reference to the
assignment of pupils by race, Brewer's superintendent's reports
refer to "white schools" and "colored schools" as general catego-
ries without comment of the appropriateness of the division.41 In
his 1866 report, he applauded the decision of the citizens of
Leavenworth to appropriate $20,000 for the construction of a
separate brick school house for the white and colored pupils. 42
In 1869, Brewer stepped down from his position as state dis-
trict court judge and assumed the position of Leavenworth City
Attorney. However, he was back on the bench the following year
when he was elected to the first of three six-year terms on the
Kansas Supreme Court. Eleven years later, while a member of
Kansas' highest court, Brewer had the occasion to rule on the
legality of a system of segregated schools similar to the one he
had helped establish in Leavenworth. In Board of Education v.
Tinnon,43 an African-American parent challenged the legality of
the decision of the board of education of Ottawa, Kansas, to es-
tablish separate schools for black and white children. Tinnon
apparently argued that the Ottawa Board of Education lacked
the authority to establish such a system under the Kansas Gen-
39 L. Lardner, supra note 4, at 10.
40 THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF LEAVEN-
WORTH CITY, KANSAS 17 (1867). At this time, African-Americans accounted for approxi-
mately 18% of school age children in Leavenworth.
41 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 75-76.
' Id. at 18. Brewer's primary point of course was not to endorse the concept of
segregated schools, but to congratulate his fellow townsmen on their decision to fund
new, brick schools and for their willingness to extend their largess to the town's African-
American pupils who accounted for approximately one-sixth of the school age
population.
" 26 Kan. 1 (1881).
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eral Education Act and that such a system was prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, rati-
fied in 1870. The trial judge agreed and issued a writ of manda-
mus compelling the admission of the plaintiff's children to the
nearest school, which in this case was the white school. The
Board then appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court.
By a two-to-one vote, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld
the ruling of the lower court, but with Justice Brewer in dissent.
The two judge majority based its ruling exclusively on the
grounds that the local board of education could exercise only
those powers explicitly granted to it by the General Education
Act. Since the statute was silent on the issue of racial segrega-
tion, the majority reasoned, the Ottawa Board had no authority
to establish a dual school system. The issue of what the four-
teenth amendment required was specifically left unresolved.
Brewer dissented on both state and federal grounds. First of
all, he did not believe that the power of localities to establish
separate schools for the races rested on specific authorization
from the state legislature. Moreover, he found that the four-
teenth amendment imposed no barrier to separate schools. As he
put it, "I dissent entirely from the suggestion that under the
14th Amendment of our Federal Constitution, the State has no
power to provide for separate schools for white and colored chill
dren. I think, notwithstanding such amendment, each State has
the power to classify school children by color, sex, or otherwise,
as to [sic] its legislature shall deem wisest and best."'44
Brewer's dissent in Tinnon is a difficult opinion to evaluate.
To say that Brewer was indifferent to the plight of African-
Americans would be to ignore his early work of behalf of black
education. It may well be that his own extensive experience in
this area led him to believe that, given contemporary racial atti-
tudes, the inability to establish separate schools would frustrate
the development of public education in the state.45 A belief that
" Id. at 23-24.
41 The potential for conflict over the issue of interracial schools was exacerbated by
the Kansas legislature's adoption of a compulsory attendance law in 1874. Morris, One
State's Struggle with Wisconsin v. Yoder: the Kansas Compulsory School Attendance
Statute and the Free Exercise of Religion, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 574 (1978) (citing 1874
Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 123, § 1, 194-95).
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African-Americans, only recently removed from slavery, needed
special help to enter American society and that that special help
could be best dispensed in black-only schools was not necessarily
inconsistent with Brewer's earlier expressions of support for the
black race."
Moreover, Brewer was almost certainly correct that the
fourteenth amendment was not commonly understood in 1881 to
have "outlawed" racially separate schools.4 7 While individual
spokesmen for that position did exist, in the nineteenth century
no state supreme court or federal court ever held that the four-
teenth amendment categorically prohibited racially segregated
schools.' The Tinnon majority, for example, shied away from
such a holding, choosing instead to invalidate the city ordinance
on much narrower grounds of statutory construction.49 Even
Justice Harlan, the great defender of African-American civil
rights, apparently accepted the constitutionality of separate
schools. 50
46 Brewer's ambivalence on this issue was characteristic of Kansans of his era. State
laws pertaining to racial segregation in schools were changed seven times between 1870
and 1881. According to the historian J. Morgan Kousser, "the shifts in the legal status of
blacks in public education in the Jayhawk State were so frequent and dramatic that they
can be followed only with a tabular guide." Kousser, Before Plessy, Before Brown: The
Development of the Law of Racial Integration in Louisiana and Kansas in TOWARD A
USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 221 (P. Finkelman & S. Gottlieb eds.
1991).
1 J. KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH CENTURY LITIGATION ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS 9-22 (1986).
48 Id. Kousser located 82 state and lower federal court cases involving racial discrim-
ination in schools decided between 1834 and 1903 (three-quarters of which were decided
after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment). While African-American plaintiffs pre-
vailed in approximately half of the cases, they normally did so on state law grounds or
else because of the patently unequal facilities provided for black schools. The only inci-
dent of a court striking down a school segregation plan on grounds that it violated the
fourteenth amendment was an 1881 decision by Judge Pearson Church of the Crawford
County (Pennsylvania) Court of Common Pleas that was reported only in a local news-
paper. For a discussion of this case, see Price, School Segregation in Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Pennsylvania, 43 PA. HIST. 121, 133-34 (1976).
"' Even so, during Brewer's lifetime, the holding of the Tinnon majority was reaf-
firmed in Knox v. Board of Educ. of the City of Independence, 45 Kan. 152 (1891) and
Bowles v. Board of Educ. of the City of Wichita, 76 Kan. 361 (1907). Ironically, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954) involved a segregated school system in Topeka,
Kansas.
"0 See Harlan's majority opinion in Cummings v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545
(1899).
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Whatever his motivation, Brewer's dissent in Tinnon would
be as direct a statement as he would ever make as to the appli-
cability of the fourteenth amendment to the civil rights of Afri-
can-Americans. Once he reached the United States Supreme
Court, his approach would be to avoid this central constitutional
issue, even when it was directly presented, and even when it
meant rooting his opinions in the narrow technicalities and crab-
bed legalisms that he, normally eschewed. In each subsequent
opinion that Brewer wrote involving the question of race, he was
able to sidestep the critical question of the constitutional basis
of state-mandated racial classifications.
BREWER'S APPOINTMENT TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
After winning reelection to the Kansas Supreme Court in
1876 and 1882, Brewer was appointed to the Federal Circuit
Court for the Eighth Circuit in 1884 by President Chester Alan
Arthur. Five years later, after gaining national attention with a
number of his opinions, he was named by President Benjamin
Harrison to replace the recently deceased Justice Stanley Ma-
thews in the United States Supreme Court." In January, 1890,
he was sworn in as an associate justice of the Court, a position
he was to hold until his death in 1910. His colleagues on the
Court included his uncle Stephen Field and, less than a year af-
ter his appointment, his Yale classmate Henry Brown.
Brewer's first United States Supreme Court opinion dealing
with the rights of African-Americans came in Louisville, New
Orleans and Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi,52 a case that was
argued during his first month as a justice. The Louisville Rail-
way case represented a challenge to the recently adopted Missis-
sippi statute that required the segregation of passengers by race
on any railroad in the state. The appellant railroad, which had
been convicted of violating the act shortly after it took effect,
contended that the legislation operated as an unconstitutional
restraint on interstate commerce.
While the case did present an important commerce clause
"' The story of Brewer's appointment is recounted in L. Lardner, supra note 4, at
53.
" 133 U.S. 587, 588 (1890).
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issue, the more fundamental question raised by the Mississippi
statute was whether or not such restriction could survive scru-
tiny under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In his opinion, however, Brewer chose not to address the
latter issue, observing at the outset that the present case was not
''a civil action brought by an individual to recover damages for
being compelled to occupy one particular compartment, or pre-
vented from riding on the train." 53 Consequently, Brewer as-
serted, the case did not present a "question of personal insult or
alleged violation of personal rights." '54 Instead, he maintained,
the question was limited "to the power of the State to compel
railroad companies to provide, within the State, separate accom-
modations for the two races." 55 Whether such accommodation
was "to be a matter of choice or compulsion" did not "enter into
this case."'56 This attempt to define the issues before the Court
in such a way that racial implications could be discounted would
become characteristic of the way in which Brewer would ap-
proach civil rights cases throughout his tenure on the Court. Al-
though the case fundamentally turned on the constitutionality
of a state-mandated racial distinction, Brewer struggled to re-
solve it on the more technical and racially neutral issue of the
constitutional limits of state police power.
Even with the issue restricted in this manner, precedent
seemed to be on the side of the railroad. In an 1877 decision,
Hall v. Decuir,57 the United States Supreme Court had invali-
dated a statute enacted by Louisiana's reconstruction era gov-
ernment forbidding racial discrimination in the seating of pas-
sengers on common carriers on the grounds that it infringed
upon the federal commerce power. Although Louisville Railway
appeared to be the mirror image of Hall, Brewer was able to
distinguish the later case by arguing that the effect of the Loui-
siana statute in Hall was to control commerce beyond the bor-
ders of the state (i.e., interstate commerce) while the Mississippi
law applied solely to commerce within the state (intrastate com-




95 U.S. 485 (1878).
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merce). Brewer conveniently ignored the fact that no such dis-
tinction had been made in the Court's opinion in Hall. Brewer
also accepted as conclusive the determination by the Mississippi
Supreme Court in the previous decision that the statute applied
only to intrastate commerce 8 even though a similar determina-
tion by the Louisiana Supreme Court had been rejected by
Brewer's predecessors thirteen years earlier."
According to Brewer, the requirement of separate cars was
analogous to the statutes requiring certain accommodations at
depots or compelling trains to stop at crossings of other rail-
roads-restrictions that had been recognized as consistent with
the powers of state governments to regulate on behalf of the
health and safety of their citizens. Brewer's decision to resolve
the case exclusively on commerce clause grounds was accepted
by all of his colleagues except Joseph Bradley and John Mar-
shall Harlan who, in a vigorous dissent, denounced the weak-
nesses of Brewer's distinction between intrastate and interstate
commerce and insinuated that the statute might also be uncon-
stitutional on other grounds.6 0
If one concedes that the Louisville Railroad case was prop-
erly decided as a commerce clause case, then it is difficult to say
that Brewer's opinion is inconsistent with his subsequent hold-
ings in other commerce clause cases. The commerce clause opin-
ions of the Fuller Court generally defy any easy categorization,
in large part because the Court never worked out an adequate
theoretical framework for determining the point at which the ex-
ercise of the state police power impinged upon interstate com-
merce. 1 Brewer's opinions also reflect this tendency toward re-
sult-orientation. On the one hand, he was sympathetic to the
desires of states to regulate the operation of railroads and other
common carriers. He supported, over commerce clause chal-
lenges, the right of states to bar the importation of allegedly dis-
eased livestock from other states, even when it took the form of
58 Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Ry. v. State, 66 Miss. 662, 675 (1889).
19 The Hall Court rejected the reasoning of the Louisiana Supreme Court in DeCuir
v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875).
'0 Louisville Railway, 133 U.S. at 592.
11 See D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY,
1888-1896 31-32, 79-80 (1990).
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an absolute ban on imports from a particular state.2 He also
believed that the commerce clause permitted states with prohi-
bition laws to bar the importation of alcoholic beverages from
other states 3 and allowed them to impose licenses on agents hir-
ing laborers for work outside the state64 and on elevators and
warehouses on the right of way of railroads, 65 as well as to re-
quire railroads to provide rail connections for the exchange of
cars,66 and to fine interstate telegraph companies for illegal
charges. 7 On the other hand, he believed that both a ban on the
sale of cigarettes within a state6 8 and a state law requiring inter-
state trains to stop at specific towns69 were both undue burdens
on interstate commerce and that the commerce clause prohib-
ited a state from requiring out of state corporations to pay a
charter fee based on capital stock as a prerequisite for continu-
ing to do business within its borders.7 0 In the other major com-
merce clause case decided during the October 1990 term, Leisy
v. Hardin7 1 Brewer joined the dissenters who argued for greater
deference to the state police power.
Brewer's tactic in Louisville Railroad of defining away the
racial issue was not lost on his contemporaries. For those who
hoped to have the Supreme Court directly confront the issue of
the constitutionality of the spate of "Jim Crow" accommodation
laws adopted around 1890, it was an obstacle that had to be
overcome. 2 Homer Plessy's attorney Albion Tourgee realized
", Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198, 201 (1901); Smith v. St. Louis & S.W. Ry., 181
U.S. 248 (1901). Brewer was the author of the majority opinion in Rasmussen.
"3 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890). Brewer took this position by joining in
Justice Horace Gray's dissent.
' Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 278 (1900).
" Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pac. R.R. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287 (1900).
I /d.
7 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S. 92, 103 (1901).
68 Brewer took this position in his dissenting opinion in Austin v. Tennessee, 179
U.S. 343, 364 (1900).
89 Lake Shore and Michigan S. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 336 (1899).
70 Western Union Tel. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1910).
7 Leisy, 135 U.S. at 125.
72 Between 1887 and 1894, nine southern states-Florida, Mississippi, Texas, Louisi-
ana, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, Georgia, and Kentucky-adopted laws mandating
segregation on common carriers. For a discussion of the wave of segregationist legislation
in the 1880's and 1890's in the South see C. LOFGREN, supra note 1, at 20-27.
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this in 1892 while planning the appeal in the case that would
reach the Supreme Court as Plessy v. Ferguson. In an apparent
reference to Brewer's Louisville Railroad opinion, Tourgee wrote
to his co-counsel that "the first effort of the Supreme Court is
always to hunt a hole to crawl out of deciding anything they
[sic] can possibly evade."' "7
JUSTICE BREWER'S ROLE IN Plessy v. Ferguson
There were a number of reasons to believe that if Brewer
were forced to confront the issue of whether a separate accom-
modations act violated the personal rights of African-Americans,
he would rule in the affirmative. The very fact that he had gone
to such lengths to draw a careful distinction between the com-
merce clause and the Fourteen Amendment issues in Louisville
Railroad implied that were the latter before the Court, he at
least might have reached a quite different result. Moreover, by
the mid-1890's, Brewer had emerged as perhaps the Court's
most fervent defender of individual liberty against state
encroachment.
As a justice, Brewer travelled the route of laissez-faire con-
stitutionalism blazed by his uncle, Stephen Field. 4 In an era
when the Supreme Court became, at least in the opinion of its
critics, notorious for its hostility to the regulatory state, Brewer
stood apart from his colleagues in the intensity of his belief that
the United States Constitution protected private property from
public regulation in all but a limited number of situations. 75
" Letter from Albion Tourgee to James C. Walker (Mar., 1892).
14 See C. SWISHER, STEPHEN FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1969 ed.). Field's consti-
tutional views are examined in a number of works. See also McCurdy, Justice Field and
the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. OF AM. HIST. 970 (1975); McCurdy, Stephen J.
Field and the American Judicial Tradition, in THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 5-18 (1986); G.
WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 84-
108 (2nd ed., 1988). Brewer's subsequent relations with his uncle have also been ad-
dressed. See generally L. Lardner, supra note 4, at 53-54; J. SEMONCHE, supra note 9, at
57-58.
"I In the words of constitutional historian David Currie, both Justice Brewer and
Rufus Peckham, his colleague from 1895 to 1909, stood at the "forefront of the Court's
assault on social legislation." Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full Faith
and the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 901 (1985). Perhaps the boldest
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Brewer's views on the issues of economic liberty had been evi-
dent long before his appointment to the Supreme Court. On the
Kansas Supreme Court and later on the federal Eighth Circuit,
he had openly questioned the wide latitude given to state eco-
nomic regulation by the United States Supreme Court decisions
of the 1870's and 1880's. On the Kansas Supreme Court in 1883,
he had questioned the propriety of the Kansas prohibition act,7 s
and three years later as a federal circuit court judge he declared
it unconstitutional, 7 a holding reversed the following year by
the United States Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas.78 In
1888, in a case involving the reasonableness of rates established
by the Iowa Railroad Commission, Brewer rejected arguments
that the United States Supreme Court's 1873 landmark holding
in Munn v. Illinois7e obligated him to hold that the reasonable-
ness of rates was a legislative, not a judicial, question. 0
From the time of his arrival in 1890, Brewer joined in most
of the United States Supreme Court's highly publicized "pro-
property" decisions, beginning with the landmark case of Chi-
cago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota"1 which
overturned the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission
Act of 1887 on due process grounds. In subsequent years, he
statement of his views came in Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public At-
tack, 55 NEw ENGLANDER 97 (1891) (initially delivered as address at Yale Law School
and later published in pamphlet form),
7" State v. Muglar, 29 Kan. 252 (1883).
" State v. Walruff, 26 F. 178, 200 (D. Kan. 1886). In Muglar, Brewer had raised the
issue of the act's constitutionality, but had not formally dissented. Muglar, 29 Kan. at
252.
'a 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
79 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Munn and its companion cases upheld the so-called
"Granger" laws that placed restrictions on railroads and grain elevator companies in the
name of the public interest.
" Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Dey, 35 F. 866, 879 (S.D. Iowa 1888). Brewer's opinion has
been viewed by some as in direct contradiction to Munn. See A. PAUL, supra note 4, at
53-54. However, the Iowa act at issue did provide for judicial review of the Commission's
rates, and Brewer himself maintained that its decision was consistent with Chief Justice
Morrison Waite's assertion that "the State cannot require a railroad.corporation to carry
persons or property without reward." Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S.
307, 331 (1886). Also, the following year, Brewer upheld a revised rate schedule against a
similar challenge. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Dey, 38 F. 656, 664 (1889). For a
discussion of these cases, see L. Lardner, supra note 4, at 53-54.
S 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
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joined in decisions that upheld a railroad's right to a fair return
on its investment and the Court's power to determine the rea-
sonableness of maximum railroad rates,82 struck down the fed-
eral income tax, 3 narrowed the effect of the Sherman Antitrust
Act,8' sanctioned the power of federal judges to enjoin strikes
against railroads,85 and elevated the principle of liberty of con-
tract to constitutional status.8 6
The true indication of Brewer's commitment to the consti-
tutional protection of individual liberty, however, came not from
the cases in which he agreed with the majority, but from those
in which he dissented because he felt his colleagues were not
willing to go far enough. From the outset, Brewer had made it
clear that he believed that the Supreme Court had been lax in
its obligation to enforce the rights of private property guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment and the Declaration of Inde-
pendence (to which Brewer afforded quasi-constitutional status).
In an 1891 address at Yale Law School, the recently appointed
justice proclaimed:
[W]e must re-cast some of our judicial decisions; and if that be
not possible, we must re-write into our Constitution the affir-
mations of the Declaration of Independence, in language so
clear and preemptory that no judge can doubt or hesitate, and
no man, not even a legislator, misunderstand. I emphasize the
words clear and preemptory, for many of those who wrought
into the Constitution the Fourteenth Amendment believed
8 Reagan v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898). Brewer was the author of the majority opinion in Reagan.
83 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).
8 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
8 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895). Debs was a Brewer opinion. For a discus-
sion of the significance of the three major constitutional decisions of 1895 (Pollack,
Knight, and Debs), see A. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW 131-220
(1969 ed.).
88 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 53 (1905); and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897). Arnold Paul has main-
tained that the idea that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment embodied
the principle of liberty of contract was first acknowledged by a majority of the Court in
an otherwise obscure opinion written by Brewer in Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160,
165 (1895). In Frisbie, the Court upheld a congressional limitation on lawyer's fees in
cases involving United States pensions, but implied that Congress was not free to do as it
chose in governing employment relations.
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that they were placing therein a national guarantee against fu-
ture State invasion of private rights, but judicial decisions
have shorn it of strength and left it nothing but a figure of
speech. [Emphasis in the original.]87
On two occasions in the early 1890's, Brewer sought to overturn
the Court's holding in Munn v. Illinois that rates charged by
"businesses affected with the public interest" were a proper sub-
ject for regulation under the state police power.8 Although
neither effort succeeded, his dissent in the first of the two cases,
Budd v. New York, contains what is perhaps the most concise
statement of Brewer's constitutional vision:
The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The ut-
most possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible
protection for him and his property, is both the limitation and
the duty of government. If it may regulate the price of one ser-
vice, which is not a public service . . . why may it not with
equal reason regulate the price of all service, and the compen-
sation to be paid for the use of all property? And if so, "Look-
ing Backward" is nearer than a dream.89
In subsequent cases, Brewer argued in dissent against the
constitutionality of laws that established an eight-hour day for
miners and employees engaged in public works,90 outlawed pay-
ment of employees with scrip redeemable only in company
stores,91 prescribed the methods to be used in weighing coal in
mines where workers were paid on the basis of the amount
mined,92 forbade the sale of artificially colored oleomargarine,,"
and required individuals to submit to compulsory vaccination. 4
In cases involving the power of eminent domain or the use of the
police power to limit the rights of property owners, Brewer fre-
87 Brewer, supra note 75, at-97.
88 Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391, 410 (1894); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517,
551 (1892).
89 Budd, 143 U.S. at 551.
90 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 224 (1903); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398
(1898).
" Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 25 (1901).
8" McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 550 (1909).
9' Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 461 (1894).
8" Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
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quently dissented on the grounds that the state ought to be re-
quired to compensate the party affected by the regulation, or
that the compensation paid was inadequate.9 5 Furthermore, he
showed a reluctance to accept extensions of the federal police
power, dissenting in Champion v. Ames9" and concurring in the
decision to overturn an act of Congress in The First Employers'
Liability Cases." He also consistently maintained that the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause outlawed all gradu-
ated taxes whether they be direct or indirect.96
Brewer's general constitutional principles should have made
him highly suspicious of state-imposed regulation that limited
an individual's liberty solely on the basis of his race. If the state
could not constitutionally limit the number of hours a miner or
a baker could work (as Brewer maintained in Holden v. Hardy
and Lochner), how could it tell a citizen that he or she must
attend a specific school or ride in a specific street car? Similar
logic led him to declare unconstitutional a Congressional act
that provided for the deportation of Chinese residents who
failed to obtain a certificate of residence from the nearest dis-
trict collector of internal revenue.9 9 Three years prior to Plessy,
in a blistering dissent in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,00
Brewer attacked the act as a violation of numerous rights pro-
tected by the first eight amendments (which he insisted applied
to aliens as well as to citizens) and as being contrary to the
Christian ethic.' 01 In his dissent Brewer warned:
" Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 259 (1897); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Drainage Comm., 200 U.S. 561, 600 (1906).
96 188 U.S. 321, 364 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., Brewer, Shiras and Peckham, J.J.,
dissenting).
" 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908).
98 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 110 (1900); Magoun v. Illinois Trust and
Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 294 (1898). Both cases involved inheritance taxes, the former a
state tax and the latter a federal one. Id. Brewer was the lone dissenter in both cases. Id.
" Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25. This act was part of an ongoing campaign
against the Chinese who were no longer permitted to immigrate to the United States and
who were barred from obtaining United States citizenship regardless of how long they
had lived in the country. Id. On the movement to exclude Chinese immigrants from the
United States, see generally, M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 156-158, 397, 443-45 (1977).
100 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
101 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 733. That the United States was a "Christian Na-
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It is true this statute is directed only against the obnoxious
Chinese; but if the power exists, who shall say it will not be
exercised tomorrow against other classes and other people? If
the guarantees of these amendments can be thus ignored, in
order to get rid of this distasteful class, what security have
others that a like disregard of its provisions may not be re-
sorted to? ' °0
If nothing else, Brewer's Fong Yue Ting dissent demonstrated
that his concern for constitutional liberty was not limited solely
to the economic realm. Moreover, his 1892 address to the Ameri-
can Home Missionary Society in which he described the United
States as a multi-racial nation also seemed to suggest that he
would oppose a statute whose sole purpose was to emphasize the
alleged inferiority of an entire race.
The difficulties that Brewer experienced in reconciling his
views on liberty and race may do more to explain his abstention
in Plessy v. Ferguson than the mere fact of his absence from
oral argument. Brewer was in fact absent from the Court on
April 13, 1896. Although he was serving as the chair of the Vene-
zuelan Boundary Commission at the time, his absence from the
Court that day was probably more directly attributable to his
daughter's untimely death. 0 3 However, his absence from the
tion" was an important principle for Brewer, although he never fully explored the mean-
ing or consequences of this designation. Id. He was not, however, reluctant to incorpo-
rate this assertion in his judicial opinions. Id.; see Church of Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892); D. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN NATION
(1905).
102 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 743. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Field issued
separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 744, 761 (Field and Fuller, J.J., dissenting).
See W. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES,
1888-1910 ,at 250-51 (1967); J. SEMONCHE, supra note 9, at 58. Brewer's involvement with
the Venezuelan Boundary Commission did take a great deal of his time during the early
months of 1896. Id. On January 1 of that year, President Grover Cleveland appointed
Brewer to chair a congressionally authorized investigating commission whose purpose
was to help settle a long-standing boundary dispute between Venezuela and British
Guinea. The commission sat in Washington at intervals from January 4, 1896 to May 26,
1897. In its published report, the Commission noted that "[t]his investigation imposed
on us a large amount of labor . . .The extent of this work no one not a member of the
Commission and not participating in its labors can fully appreciate." REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT UPON THE DIVISIONAL LINE BE-
TWEEN VENEZUELA AND BRITISH GUINEA 13-14 (1898). For other sources concerning
Brewer's involvement with this commission, see G. IRELAND, BOUNDARIES, POSSESSIONS,
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Court during the oral argument in Plessy did not necessarily
eliminate his participation in the case. The Court itself at that
time had no rule that required a justice to be present at oral
argument before he could participate in the resolution of a case.
Between April 13 and April 20, the period in which Brewer
was away attending his daughter's funeral, eleven cases were
presented to the Court. Of these, five were argued orally before
the Court by both parties;' two were argued by one party
only;'I0 four were submitted to the Court with written briefs but
with no oral argument. 06 Brewer clearly did not recuse himself
from all eleven, since he authored the majority opinion in Wig-
AND CONFLICTS IN SOUTH AMERICA 236-38 (1938). Additional material may be found in
the special file on the Anglo-Venezuelan Boundary Commission included in the collec-
tion of Brewer Family Papers at Yale University Library.
After Great Britain and Venezuela agreed to submit the matter to arbitration in
February, 1897, Brewer and Chief Justice Melville Fuller were appointed as the United
States' representatives on the five-man arbitral tribunal. This ultimately required
Brewer to spend the month of January and much of the summer of 1899 in Paris attend-
ing to the business of the arbitration panel. W. KING, supra, at 249-60.
Brewer's work with the investigating commission clearly limited his ability to par-
ticipate in the affairs of the Supreme Court during the spring of 1896. After attending
the Court sessions on March 9 and 10, Brewer was absent from the Court every day until
it recessed on April 3, missing a total of sixteen daily sessions. The Court reconvened on
April 13, the day of the death of Brewer's daughter, but as previously mentioned, Brewer
was absent that entire week. He returned to the Court on Tuesday, April 21, and was
present for the remainder of that week as well as the following Monday, April 27. He was
then absent for the remainder of the week. He returned to the bench on Monday, May 4,
but did not appear again until May 25. The Court was in recess between May 9 and 24,
with the exception of May 18, when it convened for one day to deliver opinions, includ-
ing the one in Plessy v. Ferguson. Brewer was absent that day as well, and two of his
opinions in other cases were read by Chief Justice Fuller. The record of Brewer's attend-
ance at the sessions of the United States Supreme Court for the spring of 1896 is con-
tained in the JOURNAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (October Term,
1895). In other words, Brewer's work with the Commission might or might not have re-
quired him to be absent on April 13, but the issue was mooted by his daughter's un-
timely death.
l04 Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 163 U.S. 63 (1896) on April 17; Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) on April 16 and 17; Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 163 U.S.
445 (1896) on April 15 and 16; Kirk v. United States, 163 U.S. 49 (1896) on April 14; and
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) argued on April 13.
l06 Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896) argued and submitted on April 16; and
Northern Pac. R.R. v. Egeland, 163 U.S. 93 (1896) on April 20.
10I Steamer Coquittam v. United States, 163 U.S. 346 (1896) on April 20; Wiggan v.
Conolly, 163 U.S. 56 (1896) on April 16; Barwitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118 (1896) submit-
ted on April 13; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896) submitted on April 26.
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gan v. Conolly, 0 7 one of the cases that was submitted without
oral argument. In the reported opinions for the seven cases in
which at least one of the sides presented its argument orally,
only in Plessy is it specifically mentioned that Brewer took no
part in the proceedings.
08
Although neither Brewer's personal papers nor the records
of the Court provide adequate evidence to support such a con-
clusion, one is tempted to believe that Brewer's unavoidable ab-
sence from oral argument gave him the opportunity to avoid
participating in a case that made him uncomfortable and, given
the opportunity, he took it. Interestingly, in his subsequent civil
rights opinions, Brewer quietly distanced himself from the
Plessy decision, never citing it as authority-even when, as in
10I Wiggan, 163 U.S. at 59. Wiggan involved an appeal from the Supreme Court of
Kansas, a fact that may explain why the opinion was assigned to Brewer. Id. The deci-
sion was handed down on May 4, 1896. Id.
108 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 564. Similarly, on May 18, 1896, a day set aside by the Court
for the delivery of opinions, the Supreme Court handed down decisions in 34 cases, 27 of
which had been argued or submitted to the Court between March 17 and May 1 of that
year. Of the 27, 17 had featured an oral argument either by both (14) or at least one (3)
of the parties to the case. The remaining 10 were submitted on briefs alone. According to
Court records, Brewer was present for the oral argument in only one of the 17 (Indiana v.
Kentucky, .163 U.S. 520 (1896)), argued on April 27. However, in only five of the remain-
ing 16 cases is he identified as having taken no part. It is difficult to see a pattern in
these cases. Two of the five decisions-Plessy and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 229 (1896)-involved the rights of racial minorities, but so did Murray v. Louisiana,
190 U.S. 127 (1903), which contains no reference to Brewer's absence. The other three
cases seemed to have little if anything in common. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299,
300 (1896) involved the power of a state to prohibit the running of freight trains on
Sunday while United States v. Rider, 163 U.S. 132, 135 (1896) and Webster v. Daly, 163
U.S. 155, 156 (1896) involved the Court's jurisdiction over appeals under the Judiciary
Act of 1891. In terms of the sequence of the arguments, Brewer is listed as having taken
no part in the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and fifteenth of the seventeen cases. Oral argu-
ments in United States v. Winchester and Potomac R.R. Co., 163 U.S. 244 (1896) were
begun on March 31 and concluded on April 1, the day the Court heard the argument in
Rider. Brewer was absent both days, but is listed as having taken no part only in the
latter decision.
In two of the 10 cases submitted on briefs alone, Brewer authored the majority opin-
ion. See Burfenning v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Omaha Ry., 163 U.S. 321, 322
(1896); Union Nat'l Bank v. Louisville, New Albany, and Chicago Ry., 163 U.S. 325, 329
(1896). The remaining eight contain no Brewer opinions, and there is no mention of his
failure to participate in the deliberations of the Court. Because Brewer was absent on
May 18, his opinions in Burfenning and Union National Bank were read by Chief Jus-
tice Fuller. All of the decisions handed down on May 18, 1896, are included in volume
163 of the United States Reports.
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Berea College v. Kentucky, 09 it seemed to be directly on point.
BREWER'S SUBSEQUENT CIVIL RIGHTS OPINIONS
Brewer's next opinion in a case involving African-American
civil rights did not come. until 1903. That year, in Tarrance v.
Florida,110 Brewer refused to overturn the convictions of several
African-American appellants who had been convicted by an all
white jury from which blacks had allegedly been systematically
excluded. On December 5, 1900, James Tarrance, Will Smith,
Amos Clark, and others had been indicted for murder by a
grand jury in Escambia County, Florida. In response, the de-
fendants' attorney had filed a motion to quash the venire and
the panels of the grand and petit jurors on the grounds that all
African-Americans had been excluded from juries in Escambia
County for many years. The following day the prosecutor moved
to dismiss the defendants' motion, a request that was granted by
the trial judge. The defendants subsequently refiled their mo-
tion, supported by an affidavit asserting that while there were
more than 1400 adult African-American males in Escambia
County, none had ever been called for jury duty. This motion.
was also denied, and the defendants were subsequently tried,
convicted, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The convic-
tion was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court."'
Although there was little reason to doubt the veracity of the
defendants' claim of systematic racial exclusion, Brewer man-
aged to resolve the case without reaching the central issue-the
legality of the indictment of the defendants by a grand jury from
which African-Americans were systematically excluded. Instead,
Brewer defined the case as one that turned on procedural, rather
than constitutional, issues. Although Brewer acknowledged that
the right to trial by a jury selected without discrimination on the
basis of race was protected by the Constitution," 2 he dismissed
the appeal on two grounds. In an opinion that quoted liberally
1o9 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
o188 U.S. 519 (1903).
" Tarrance v. State, 43 Fla. 446, 30 So. 685 (1901).
1.. This had been established in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09
(1879).
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from the previous opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, he first
found that defendants had not properly proved that the discrim-
ination had in fact existed. Brewer admitted that "an actual dis-
crimination is as potential in creating a denial of equality of
rights as a discrimination made by law," '113 but that such an epi-
sode of discrimination could not be proven solely by an affidavit
from the indicted parties.' 14 Since the appellants had offered no
additional evidence other than their own assertion that the dis-
crimination existed, the Supreme Court could not assume that
the assertion was correct.115 The second basis for denying the
appeal was the determination of the Florida Supreme Court that
under Florida law objections to the selection procedure for a
grand jury by an indicted party had to be made through a plea
in abatement, rather than through a motion to quash the venire
and panel (the motion filed by the defendants in this case). Af-
ter examining the prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court
cited in the previous opinion, Brewer concluded that this was
the settled law in the state of Florida and that, therefore, there
was no error for the Supreme Court to correct. '
Later that same year, Brewer issued his only dissent in a
case dealing with the rights of African-American voters. In Giles
113 Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519, 520 (1903).
" See Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 496 (1900); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592,
600 (1896).
115 In Carter, the Court, in an opinion joined by Brewer, had held that African-
American defendants had to be provided the opportunity to introduce evidence of sys-
tematic racial exclusion if they sought to do so. In Tarrance, the defendants apparently
had not done so at the time their motion was denied.
4 Tarrance, 188 U.S. at 524. Consideration of the second ground was necessary
because of the county prosecutor's response to the original motion filed by Tarrance and
his fellow defendants. Id. In response to the December 5, 1900, motion to quash the
venire and the panels of the grand and petit jurors, the state's attorney moved to strike
the motion on the ground that it "set up no state of facts which, if true, would justify the
quashing of the venire." Id. Technically, this amounted to an admission of the facts
alleged in defendants' motion (which included the assertion of systematic racial exclu-
sion from the jury pool) and thus relieved the defendants of an obligation to introduce
further proof of their claim. Id. In its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
county attorney's motion to strike was the equivalent of a request to deny the motion to
quash on the grounds that it was not the proper method of raising the question sought to
be raised. Id. As such, it did not amount to an admission of the accuracy of the facts
stated in defendants' motion. Brewer accepted this argument as a valid statement of
Florida law. Id.
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v. Harris,'17 an African-American resident of Montgomery, Ala-
bama, had been refused the right to register to vote. In response,
he filed a bill of equity in an Alabama federal circuit court ask-
ing the court to require the Montgomery, Alabama, election offi-
cials to add his name and those of 5,000 other qualified African-
American applicants who had been refused enrollment to the
registry of permanent voters. The appellant Giles also requested
that the recently enacted provisions of the Alabama Constitu-
tion pertaining to voter eligibility be declared unconstitutional
as contrary to the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The
circuit court refused to hear the request for want of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, found that the federal courts had jurisdiction
but refused to grant equitable relief. Holmes callously concluded
that the appellant could not ask the court to order him regis-
tered to vote under a system that the appellant himself claimed
to be unconstitutional. Furthermore, Holmes maintained that
the equity powers of the federal courts did not give them the
power to enforce political rights against the state, and that "re-
lief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the peo-
ple of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or by
the legislative and political department of the government of the
United States. 1 1 8
Justices Brown, Harlan, and Brewer all dissented, with the
latter two writing opinions. While Harlan stated that he believed
that Giles was legally entitled to be enrolled on the permanent
voter registry, he concluded that the federal circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case. 1 9 Brewer, on the other hand, felt
that Giles had asserted a right that was protected by the United
States Constitution, and that the majority was in error in hold-
ing that there was no remedy available from the federal courts.
", 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
, Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
119 The issue that concerned Harlan was the argument in Judiciary Act of Aug. 13,
1988, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, that no civil action arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States could be filed in federal court unless the value of the matter in dispute
involved more than $2000. In the majority opinion, Holmes ruled that since the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court had not been challenged on these grounds prior to the appeal, no
such claim could be raised before the Supreme Court.
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He did, however, believe that the only issue properly before the
Supreme Court was the jurisdiction of the federal courts and,
therefore, that the proper remedy was to remand the case to the
lower court for a determination on the merits.
While Brewer's dissent in Giles v. Jackson was sympathetic
to the problems confronting Southern African-Americans who
were struggling to exercise their right of suffrage, he was not
persuaded by related claims in James v. Bowman,120 also de-
cided in 1903. Writing for the majority, Brewer upheld the re-
lease from federal custody of a white Kentuckian charged with
the bribery and intimidation of black voters during the 1898
congressional elections. Brewer's opinion rested on three bases.
The first was that the controlling statute, Section 5507 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States12 1 (originally part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1870), was unconstitutional. Section 5507
made it unlawful for an individual to interfere with the attempt
of another to exercise the right of suffrage and was based on the
enforcement powers granted to Congress by section two of the
fifteen amendment. Consistent with a line of cases beginning at
the end of the Reconstruction Era,'2 2 Brewer held that the so-
called Reconstruction Amendments did not authorize Congress
to outlaw individual, as opposed to state, acts of discrimination.
However, as Brewer himself had pointed out in his dissent
in Giles v. Jackson, the previous decisions of the Supreme Court
had established that the federal courts possessed jurisdiction
over matters involved in the election of national officers (includ-
ing congressmen), independent of the fifteenth amendment.
Brewer nevertheless denied that the challenged statute was a
proper method of exerting this power. 2 ' Although the pro-
scribed conduct had occurred during a congressional election,
120 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
121 U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3712.
122 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629 (1882); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
.2 Brewer's Bowman opinion fails to mention the Court's 1884 decision in Ex parte
Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) which had upheld the federal government's power to
pass laws under Article I, section 4 of the Constitution to guarantee the rights of individ-
uals to vote in federal elections.
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the statute, according to Brewer, did not specifically limit its
application to federal elections. Since it applied indiscriminately
to all elections, the entire statute was void. Under Brewer's in-
terpretation, Congress had the power to outlaw the acts with
which Bowman had been charged, but it had not yet done so in
a constitutional fashion. Finally, as if to defend himself against
charges of racial insensitivity, Brewer noted "in passing" that
the indictment did not allege that Bowman had bribed the par-
ticular voters because of their "race, color, or previous condition
of servitude," but rather that the victims of the alleged crime
were "men of African descent, colored men, negroes, and not
white men." In his words, "They were not bribed because they
were colored men, but because they were voters. No discrimina-
tion on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude
is charged."' 2 " Harlan and Brown dissented without opinion.'25
Once again, Brewer took a case in which the civil rights of
African-Americans were the central issue and argued that it was
in fact not about civil rights at all. Although such an approach
disregarded the reality of the contemporary situation in the
South where widespread hostility toward negro suffrage was tac-
itly endorsed by state governments,'26 it allowed Brewer to con-
tinue to straddle the question of what, if any, protections the
Constitution actually provided against discrimination based on
race. He followed the same approach in the 1904 case, Jones v.
Montague,"' in which he refused to overturn the election of
congressmen under the provisions of the 1901 Virginia Constitu-
tion that had allegedly provided for the widespread disfranchise-
ment of African-American voters. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Brewer dismissed the suit in equity on the grounds that
the challenged election had already been held, the canvas of the
votes conducted, and the elected representatives had taken their
124 Bowman, 190 U.S. at 139.
"' Brewer's opinion striking down part of the 1870 Civil Rights Act produced little
public outcry. By 1903, the act was largely viewed as a dead letter. J. SEMONCHE, supra
note 9, at 58.
228 See generally, J. KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RE-
STRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); C. WOOD-
WARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 321-49 (1971).
127 194 U.S. 147 (1904).
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seats with the tacit approval of their fellow congressmen. Under
such circumstances, Brewer reasoned, the Court was powerless
to prohibit the counting of votes, as requested by the petition-
ers, even if the allegations of racial discrimination in the petition
were correct.
At the same time that Brewer masked his unwillingness to
extend constitutional protections to African-American appel-
lants under a guise of procedural considerations, he continued to
be an outspoken defender of the rights of Chinese-Americans. In
his dissenting opinion in United States v. Sing Tuck, 2 " a case
decided the same day as Jones v. Montague, Brewer refused to
endorse the constitutionality of the administrative procedures
used by the Immigration Service to deport Chinese aliens who
had allegedly entered the United States illegally. (The proce-
dures failed to provide for a judicial appeal of a determination
to deport.) Brewer argued at length that any Chinese person se-
lected for deportation should have access to the federal courts
and that the challenged system deprived Chinese-Americans of
their constitutionally protected liberties. 2 ' He closed his Sing
Tuck dissent with the following prophetic warning:
Finally, let me say that the time has been when many young
men from China came to our educational institutions to pursue
their studies, when her commerce sought our shores, and her
people came to build our railroads, and when China looked
upon this country as her best friend. If all this be reversed and
the most populous nation on earth becomes the great antago-
nist of this republic, the careful student of history will recall
the words of Scripture, "they have sown the wind, and they
128 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. at 170-82. Brewer's concern for the rights of the Chinese in
Sing Tuck and other cases might be explained by the nature of the right at issue; in Sing
Tuck and the earlier case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States,the issue was access to the
federal court system. This would be in line with what arguably could be considered his
pro-civil rights dissent in Giles v. Harris. However, the language of his dissent in Sing
Tuck suggested that his sympathies for the Chinese ran deeper than just a concern for
procedural due process. The roots of Brewer's sympathetic attitude toward the Chinese
probably lay in his missionary heritage and in his long-standing concern for world peace
and the fear that United States immigration policy might severely damage its relation-
ship with China, a nation that Brewer believed would some day play an important role in
world affairs.
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shall reap the whirlwind," and for the cause of such antago-
nism need look no further than the treatment accorded during
the last twenty years by this country to the people of that
nation. '30
However eloquent his defense of the Chinese may have
been, Brewer's indifference to the corresponding claims of Afri-
can-Americans continued in his civil rights opinions. In 1905, in
Clyatt v. the United States,1 ' Brewer again delivered an opin-
ion that asserted the rights of African-Americans under the Con-
stitution while simultaneously denying them any legal protection
in the immediate case. Clyatt involved a white defendant who
had been indicted and convicted by a federal jury for violating
the Federal Peonage Statute that had been enacted in 1869.132
The indictment charged that the defendant unlawfully and
knowingly returned Will Gordon and Mose Ridley to a condition
of peonage, by force and against their will, to work for Samuel
M. Clyatt. The record showed that Clyatt had gone from Geor-
gia to Florida to arrest the two African-Americans mentioned in
the indictment to take them against their will back to Georgia to
work off a debt. The two had been taken into custody under a
warrant charging larceny issued by a Georgia magistrate. Such
conduct was specifically outlawed by federal law, and violators
were subject to fines of between one and five thousand dollars
and prison sentences of one to five years. 133
Writing for the majority, Brewer began by affirming the
constitutionality of the peonage laws which had been enacted
under the power provided to Congress by the enforcement clause
of the thirteenth amendment. To this point, Brewer's decision
seemed to signal a rare victory for the African-American posi-
tion. Clyatt's lawyers had challenged the constitutionality of the
Federal Peonage Statute, arguing that just as previous court de-
cisions had held that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
applied only to state (as opposed to private) action, the Court
Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. at 182.
.". 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
"' Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 209.
" The Federal Peonage Act and this case are discussed in P. DANIEL, THE SHADOW
OF SLAVERY 3-17 (1972).
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should now hold that the powers granted by the thirteenth
amendment were limited by a similar restriction. Since Clyatt
was acting as a private individual and not enforcing a state stat-
ute, he was, his lawyers argued, not subject to federal law.
Brewer rejected this argument completely. Unlike the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendment, the thirteenth amendment made no
reference to states at all. Instead, it operated as a nationwide
ban on slavery and involuntary servitude and gave Congress the
authority to enforce its provisions through legislation like the
Federal Peonage Act. Brewer then proceeded to define peonage
broadly, so that it included any attempt to impose compulsory
service to secure the payment of a debt.
Then, in a complete tour de force, Brewer turned to the in-
dictment and found it insufficient because it referred to a "re-
turn . . . to a condition of peonage." As Brewer viewed the rec-
ord, there was no evidence that the two victims, Gordon and
Ridley, had been in a previous state of peonage; consequently, it
was not possible for Clyatt to return them to a condition of pe-
onage. In focusing on the precise wording of the indictment,
Brewer transformed what had begun as a peonage case into a
matter of criminal procedure where'the Court's attention was fo-
cused on the rights of the criminal defendant, Clyatt.
Brewer did this even though the defendant himself had
never made this argument. After noting the inconsistency be-
tween the language of the indictment and the evidence
presented, Brewer launched into a ringing statement of the
rights of the accused.
No matter how severe may be the condemnation which is due
to the conduct of a party charged with a criminal offense, it is
the imperative duty of a court to see that all the elements of
his crime are proved, or at least thai testimony is offered which
justifies a jury in finding those elements. Only in the exact ad-
ministration of the law will justice in the long run be done, and
the confidence of the public in such administration be
maintained. 13
Consequently, the decision of the jury was reversed. However
134 Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 222.
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strained and unexpected the result, Brewer's colleagues had lit-
tle problem with his decision. Only Harlan dissented.' 35
That Brewer might endorse an expansive reading of the
thirteenth amendment was put to rest the following year in
Hodges v. United States.'6 Hodges involved three white men
who were convicted in federal court of using physical force to
prevent a group of black laborers from carrying out a labor con-
tract with the owners of a sawmill. Brewer, again writing for the
majority, reversed the convictions on the grounds that the four-
teenth amendment gave the federal government no jurisdiction
over the action of private individuals and that the thirteenth
amendment could not be read so expansively as to prohibit this
conduct. The federal government maintained that the defend-
ants' actions had been motivated solely by the race of the vic-
tims and that, as such, it imposed a badge of servitude prohib-
ited by the thirteenth amendment. In denying that the race of
the victims provided grounds for invoking federal jurisdiction,
Brewer insisted that he was affirming the rights of African-
Americans as full American citizens. The thirteenth amendment
had, he insisted, outlawed all forms of slavery and involuntary
servitude. It had not, however, made African-Americans the spe-
cial wards of the United States government; nor had it made the
federal government, rather than the states, the guarantors of in-
dividual liberty. To allow a criminal prosecution here would be
to authorize the federal government to supplant the states as the
protectors of all the individual rights of both races and that, for
Brewer (and most of his contemporaries) was clearly beyond the
intentions of the amendment's framers. In one opinion, Brewer
commented on the federal government's treatment of former
slaves:
[Freed slaves have been dealt with in a manner] which de-
clined to constitute them wards of the nation or leave in a con-
dition of alienage where they would be subject to the jurisdic-
'" Id. at 223. While the Clyatt decision represented a defeat for the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration's efforts to enforce the Federal Peonage Act, it did at least establish the
constitutionality of the act and thereby pave the way for future, more carefully crafted,
indictments. P. DANIEL, supra note 133, at 17.
136 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
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tion of Congress, but gave them citizenship, doubtless believing
that thereby in the long run their best interest would be
served, they taking their chances with other citizens in the
States where they should make their homes. 37
The belief that African-Americans should be left on their
own to struggle for their rights in the state rather than federal
courts was at the heart of Brewer's most famous decision dealing
with issues of race, the 1908 majority opinion in Berea College v.
Kentucky.138 At issue in Berea College was a Kentucky statute
that prohibited private schools from educating black and white
students at the same time and place. In spite of the fact that the
plaintiff raised several serious constitutional challenges to the
statute, including a citation to Lochner v. New York139 (a deci-
sion in which Brewer had concurred three years earlier), Brewer
chose to resolve the case within the framework of a state's power
to regulate its corporations.
At the time it was decided, Berea College involved one of
the few remaining questions pertaining to the constitutionality
of the increasingly intricate system of "Jim Crow" restrictions
appearing in the American South. Berea College was a small, in-
dependent institution of higher learning that had been founded
"in order to promote the cause of Christ, ' 140 and was committed
to interracial education. Unlike cases involving public schools or
common carriers, Berea College was neither a public institution
nor a private enterprise historically subject to public regulation.
Instead, it was a private institution whose students were free to
go elsewhere if they objected to the integrationist policies of the
college. In 1904, its policies ran afoul of a recently enacted Ken-
tucky statute that prohibited the teaching of black and white
students in the same institution.141 Berea College was convicted
of violating the statute, and its conviction was upheld by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals.1 42
13' Hodges, 203 U.S. at 19-20.
1- 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
.31 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
40 Berea College, 211 U.S. at 60.
141 Ky. Acts 1904, chap. 85, p. 181.
141 Berea College v. State, 123 Ky. 209, 94 S.W. 623 (1906).
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Berea College was a corporation chartered by the state of
Kentucky, 43 and the first question to be answered was whether
or not the Court could rule solely on the question of the consti-
tutionality of the Kentucky Act as applied to corporations or
whether it had to rule on its general constitutionality. The deci-
sion of the lower court pointed toward the latter, since section
one of the statute in question made it unlawful for "any person,
corporation, or association" to teach black and white students
together and since the Kentucky Court of Appeals had sustained
the validity of the statute as applied to "all individuals, corpora-
tions, and associations."" 4
Brewer, predictably, took the more narrow approach, main-
taining that "it is unnecessary for us to consider anything more
than the question of its validity as applied to corporations." 1' 5
In James v. Bowman,"46 Brewer had refused to consider the sev-
erability of the provisions of a federal civil rights act, but here
he was willing to treat the Kentucky act as though it contained
separate provisions relating to individuals, corporations, and as-
sociations. Brewer wrote:
The statute is clearly separable and may be valid as to one
class while invalid as to another. Even if it were conceded that
its assertion of power over individuals cannot be sustained, still
it must be upheld so far as it restrains corporations. There is
no force in the suggestion that the statute, although clearly
separable, must stand or fall as an entirety on the ground the
legislature would not have enacted one part unless it could
reach all.147
Since Berea College was a corporation chartered by the
state of Kentucky, its charter was subject to revocation, altera-
tion, or amendment by the state, so long as the object of the
charter was not substantially impaired. The language of the
challenged statute, according to Brewer, operated as a legitimate
143 The original charter was approved on March 9, 1854. On June 10, 1899, it was
reincorporated.
... Berea College, 211 U.S. at 46.
'4 Id. at 54.
Bowman, 190 U.S. at 127.
147 Berea College, 211 U.S. at 54-55.
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amendment to the school's charter, even though the act itself
made no reference to corporate charters. Brewer made the last
assertion without any citation to precedent, stating only that to
decide otherwise would be "resting too much on mere form.
148
Having redefined the issue, Brewer was able to decide the case
in such a way that was consistent with his general constitutional
principles but which did not require him affirmatively to ap-
prove of the power of the state to discriminate against individu-
als solely on the basis of their race. Throughout his career
Brewer had drawn a sharp constitutional distinction between
private individuals and corporations. Because the latter were
creations of the state, they were therefore subject to a degree of
public regulation that Brewer found unacceptable when applied
to private individuals.1 4 In fact, Brewer went to great lengths to
distinguish the property rights of individuals from those of cor-
porations because his constitutional and economic philosophy'
was based on the individual economic actor, not the modern
business corporation. 150
On the Court, Brewer proved to be less sympathetic to the
claims of corporations (and railroads in particular) than many of
14 Id. at 57.
"4 That Brewer drew such a distinction has not always been appreciated. The view
popularized by progressive historians that Justices like Brewer were merely agents for
corporate interests has been generally abandoned in favor of a more sophisticated inter-
pretation that places them within the nineteenth century liberal tradition. There are
several progressive interpretations of Brewer. See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 138 (1974); A. PAUL,
supra note 4, at 54. There are also more moderate evaluations. See Bergan, supra note 4,
at 53; Garner, supra note 4, at 53; J. SEMONCHE, supra note 9, at 24, 54; see also 0. FIss,
supra note 4, at 69. '
IBO For a concise statement of this position by Brewer, see his concurrence in North-
ern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 360 (1905) (Brewer, J., concurring). It was his
adherence to this distinction that had led both the opponents and supporters of business
interests to applaud his nomination to the Court in 1889. One anti-corporation newspa-
per proclaimed that his record showed that he was "hostile to corporations and monopo-
lies." New York World (undated clipping included in Brewer's scrapbook in collection of
Brewer Family Papers). Another praised him for a recent decision "against railroads
which shippers consider not only sound law but favorable to their interests." Burlington
(Iowa) Hawkeye (undated clipping included in Brewer's scrapbook in collection of
Brewer Family Papers). On the other hand, one pro-business paper saw him as a nomi-
nee likely to protect the interests of railroads from state railroad commissions. Wall
Street Daily News (undated clipping included in Brewer's scrapbook in collection of
Brewer Family Papers).
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his colleagues. In numerous public addresses while on the bench,
Brewer openly criticized the excesses of American corporations.
According to Brewer, corporate action was "often selfish, re-
morseless, and cruel"; 51 efforts of corporations to "crush out op-
position" were to be denounced as violations of "the first princi-
ples of the Declaration of Independence"; 15 2 and combinations of
capital were to be derided for destroying their financially inse-
cure competitors. 53
Brewer also believed that states should be permitted great
latitude in controlling their corporations, so long as they guaran-
teed them a fair return on their investment. In Smiley v. Kan-
sas, 54 Brewer rejected a challenge to a Kansas antitrust law that
prohibited price-fixing arrangements. Although the appellant
grain dealers argued that the Kansas statute was an unconstitu-
tional limitation on the liberty to contract, Brewer found no
merit to this argument under the circumstances. He also wrote a
number of dissents in cases in which he believed the Court had
improperly interfered with the power of the states to force rail-
roads to fulfill their duty to the public.1 55 In Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Railroad v. Matthews, he authored the majority
opinion which upheld a Kansas law that required railroads to
pay the attorney fees of successful plaintiffs whose property had
been damaged by fires caused by trains. 56 Although he had
joined the majority in limiting the application of the Sherman
Antitrust Act in the E. C. Knight decision, he was also generally
sympathetic to the Justice Department's prosecutions of large
corporations under the Act.1 57 He sided with the progressive ma-
"' See Brewer, supra note 34, at 69.
15 Address to the Association of Agents of the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company (1908), quoted in L. Lardner, supra note 4, at 53.
" Brewer's dislike of the predatory practices of large corporations is elaborated in
several works. See Brewer, Organized Wealth and the Judiciary, 57 THE INDEPENDENT
301 (1904); L. Lardner, supra note 4, at 53.
154 196 U.S. 447 (1905).
"I Northern Pac. R.R. v. Washington Territory ex. rel, Dustin, 142 U.S. 492 (1892);
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. United States, 189 U.S. 274 (1903).
156 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
117 It has been argued that United States v. E.C. Knight itself was not simply an
attempt to insulate American corporations from national regulation, but an effort by the
Supreme Court to compel the states to enforce their corporate laws. McCurdy, The
Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporate Law,
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jority in Addystone Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States15 ' (a
decision that substantially undercut the impact of E. C.
Knight'"), and he provided the critical fifth vote in Northern
Securities Co. v. United States,'60 which upheld the application
of the Antitrust Act to a powerful railroad holding company.
6
'
In Brewer's view, large combinations of capital and meddlesome
legislatures were equally objectionable, because both threatened
the economic freedom of the individual, the hallmark of his con-
stitutional philosophy.
Although Berea College was hardly a major corporation, to
emphasize its corporate form was to emphasize the power of the
state to regulate and to downplay any protections the fourteenth
amendment might provide. Certainly, Brewer was correct that
states had the power to reserve the right to amend corporate
charters. (The recognition of this power dated back to Justice
Story's concurrence in the case of Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege" 2 and the Constitution of the State of Kentucky specifically
reserved this right for the legislature).'6 However, Brewer's
opinion, while acknowledging that the act might be unconstitu-
tional as applied to individuals, ignored the possibility that the
fourteenth amendment placed limitations on this particular
power, especially when the state sought to impose racially moti-
vated modifications. As had been the case many times before,
1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 304 (1979).
158 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The significance of Addystone is discussed in several works.
See M. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at
130-33 (1988); M. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 532 (1988).
1 In his concurrence in the Northern Sec. Co. case, Brewer drew a distinction be-
tween the rights of state-created corporations and the rights of individuals, suggesting
that not all constitutional protections available to the latter applied to the former.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Brewer, J., dissenting); see also
0. FIss, supra note 4, at 54.
'Go 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
61 Brewer also voted to uphold Sherman Act prosecutions in Montague & Co. v.
Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904), Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), and Loewe
v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
162 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
le Section 3 of the Bill of Rights of the 1850 Kentucky Constitution (in force at the
time of this case and still in force today) provides that "every grant of a franchise, privi-
lege, or exemption shall remain, subject to revocation, alteration, or amendment." KY.
CONST. § 3 (1850).
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Harlan was not persuaded by Brewer's distinctions. In his dis-
sent, joined by Justice William Day, Harlan rejected Brewer's
assertion that the statute was severable and went on to argue
that the actions of his home state's legislature were "an arbi-
trary invasion of the rights of liberty and property guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment against hostile state action, and
is, therefore, void."164
Brewer's opinion in Berea College followed the same pat-
tern as all his majority opinions in cases involving the civil rights
of African-Americans. He affirmed the general rights claims by
appellants and even acknowledged that legal remedies might be
available in different circumstances, but in the case at hand, he
determined that other considerations governed. In his opinion,
he scrupulously avoided any reference to Plessy v. Ferguson,
and he left open the possibility that the fourteenth amendment
might protect private individuals who sought integrated school-
ing. In reality, Brewer's opinion had the practical effect of legiti-
mizing such statutes until well after World War II.
JUSTICE BREWER: AN EVALUATION
Berea College was the last case dealing with the civil rights
of African-Americans decided by the United States Supreme
Court before Brewer's death in March 1910. From the perspec-
tive of modern notions of constitutionally guaranteed civil
rights, his record was hardly an impressive one. Of course, the
fact that a Northern judge in the late nineteenth century, even
one who had held strong abolitionist views in his youth, would
adopt an attitude of indifference toward the civil rights of Afri-
can-Americans was not in itself remarkable. Large numbers of
formerly anti-slavery Northerners "gave up" on the cause of Af-
rican-American civil rights in the aftermath of Reconstruction
and acquiesced in the restoration of white supremacy in the
South. Beginning in the late 1870's, Northern liberals began a
164 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1908). As authority, Harlan cited
the substantive due process cases, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) and Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), decisions in which Brewer had enthusiastically
joined.
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steady retreat on the race issue.'65 As white Southerners aban-
doned earlier pledges to protect the constitutional rights of Afri-
can-Americans, Northern opinion began to emphasize concilia-
tion with the South rather than the defense of civil rights. In the
words of historian C. Vann Woodward:
It was quite common in the 'eighties and 'nineties to find in
the Nation, Harper's Weekly, the North American Review, or
the Atlantic Monthly Northern liberals and former abolition-
ists mouthing the shibboleths of white supremacy regarding
the Negro's innate inferiority, shiftlessness, and hopeless unfit-
ness for full participation in the white man's civilization. Such
expressions doubtless did much to add to the reconciliation of
North and South, but they did so at the expense of the
Negro.'
Although this acquiescence was initially coupled with an under-
standing that African-Americans would not be deprived of their
formal legal rights, by the end of the nineteenth century it had
come to include an acceptance of legalized segregation and
disfranchisement.167
While Brewer declined to use his position of authority as a
Justice of the United States Supreme Court on behalf of the
civil rights of African-Americans, his overall views on race did
not harden to the degree described by Woodward. In fact, if one
looks only at the pronouncements Brewer made off the bench
between 1890 and 1910, he comes across as a crusader for equal
treatment of the black race at a time when educated Americans,
in the North as well as the South, were becoming increasingly
persuaded by scientific theories of racial inferiority.1 6 Certainly,
165 C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 69-74 (2d ed. 1966).
166 Id. at 70.
167 For other discussions of Northern racial attitudes in the late nineteenth century,
see G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-
AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 283-325 (1971); C. LOFGREN, supra note
1, at 51; W. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 62-81, 133-40
(1982); L. SIMPSON, MIND AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A MEDITATION ON LOST CAUSES
(1989) (for racial views of greater New England culture specifically); see also Nelson, The
Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Reasoning in Nineteenth Century
America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
"I See generally J. HALLER, OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF
RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859-1900 (1971) (noting that Brewer never became as callous to
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Brewer never believed that he had abandoned the cause of his
youth. In a fourth of July oration in 1893, he spoke glowingly of
the importance of the anti-slavery movement, of John Brown,
and of the thirteenth amendment for their role in helping "per-
sonal liberty" become "the universal affirmation of the law."' 69
The progress of the black race was a topic he returned to with
regularity, and he welcomed the opportunity to address African-
American audiences. 170 At the time of his death, he was eulo-
gized for his sympathy "with the oppressed of all races and
classes. ''117 1
How then, does one explain the apparent inconsistency be-
tween Brewer's professed support for the rights of African-
Americans and the lengths to which he went while on the Court
to avoid endorsing that position? At least part of the answer can
be found in an address on the cause of black education Brewer
delivered to the American Missionary Association shortly after
the turn of the century. In this address, Brewer took aim at
those who used the claim of alleged black inferiority to justify a
reduction in support for black education. Lavishing praise on
Hampton Institute (which he had recently visited) and Booker
T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute and its offspring, Brewer
plight of African-Americans as his uncles Stephen and Henry Field); C. LOFGREN, supra
note 1, at 51 (discussion of racial attitudes of Henry Field); C. MCCURDY, Stephen J.
Field and the American Judicial Tradition, in THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 17 (1986) (dis-
cussion of racial attitudes of Stephen Field).
.. Address by Justice Brewer at Woodstock, Connecticut (July 4, 1893) (included in
collection of Brewer Family Papers).
170 Writings by Brewer that reflect a sympathetic attitude toward race include
Brewer, Address of Mr. Justice Brewer, in MINUrEs OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEr-
ING OF THE AMERICAN HOME MISSIONARY SOCIETY 95 (1892); Brewer, Plain Words on the
Crime of Lynching, 97 LESLIE'S WEEKLY 182 (1903); Brewer, Address at 30th Anniver-
sary of Hampton Institute, 35 THE SOUTHERN WORKMAN 359 (1906); Letter to editors of
the Paladium (n.d.) (unidentified letter included in collection of Brewer Family Papers);
Address Delivered at the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the American Missionary Associa-
tion (Nov. 21, 1896) [hereinafter Jubilee Address] (future equality of the races forseen);
Address at the Commencement Exercises of the University of Wisconsin Law School
(deploring disfranchisement of African-American voters); Address on the Black Race De-
livered to Black Students at an Unidentified College or University (n.d.) (unidentified
address included in collection of Brewer Family Papers); Address on the Education of
Black People Delivered to an Unidentified Association (n.d.) (unidentified address in-
cluded in collection of Brewer Family Papers).
"I H. KARRICK, supra note 8, at 57.
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compared African-Americans to the Hebrew slaves of the Old
Testament who had been delivered out of bondage in Egypt by
Moses. It had been necessary for the ancient Hebrews to wander
for forty years in the wilderness before reaching the promised
land, and, in Brewer's view, only time was required for African-
Americans to achieve their proper role in society. In pleading
the case for continued white support of black education, Brewer
proclaimed: "They are here as citizens. Whatever temporary re-
strictions may be placed upon their approach to the ballot box,
the time will come when all barriers will be broken down and
they will enjoy everywhere the full rights of citizenship. ' 17 2 In
the short run, however, there were problems that the "race" had
to overcome-ignorance, susceptibility to demagoguery, the in-
ability to "distinguish between liberty and license," and the fail-
ure to understand "the obligations of morality and purity."1 73
Similarly, in an address to African-American college students
(probably at Hampton Institute), Brewer rejected the idea that
the black race would always be at the bottom of society, compar-
ing the status of African-Americans in 1900 with that of Anglo-
Saxons in the Roman world of 2000 years before. He emphasized
the absolute necessity of self-help and suggested that the "fail-
ure" of Reconstruction was related to the fact that "no race is
ever lifted up into a higher life simply through outside forces."
He also made it clear that he viewed the responsibility for black
advancement to lie with the educated men in his audience.17 4
Such statements reveal that although Brewer repudiated
the idea that the proper role of government could ever be one of
paternalism, his attitude toward African-Americans was colored
by the very same paternalistic impulse that had led him to ac-
cept the legitimacy of separate schools in Tinnon. The status of
African-Americans was essentially that of minor children. Ulti-
mately their entitlement to the full rights of citizenship was not
a matter for dispute. However, until they were ready to assume
the citizenship's mantle, they, like minor children, might have to
'" Jubilee Address, supra note 170, at 139-40.
Id. Although undated, the address makes reference to the recently published
1900 United States Census.
"' Address to Black Students of Unidentified College or University by Justice
Brewer (n.d.) (unidentified address included in collection of Brewer Family Papers).
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accept some limitations on the full exercise of their rights.
On the other hand, Brewer's aversion to governmental pa-
ternalism dictated that the responsibility of attaining the right
to full citizenship lay with blacks themselves and their white
supporters and not with the state. As a practical matter, this
meant that African-Americans would have to accept the indigni-
ties of the emerging "Jim Crow" system. However, according to
Brewer, they could take consolation in the fact that their current
status was only temporary because their progress as a race was
inevitable. The day would come when racial distinctions would
be unnecessary. Consequently, while it would be improper for
the Supreme Court to afford any special status to their claims, it
would also be inappropriate for the Court to imply that African-
Americans were locked into a permanently inferior position in
American society. It was a situation in which the most desirable
approach was to evade the issue whenever possible. When the
creed of individual liberty clashed with the social reality of race,
Brewer chose to take refuge in the very sort of technical niceties
that he normally eschewed.
While Brewer should not be exonerated for his failure to ac-
knowledge the meritorious claims of African-Americans to con-
stitutional protections, his experience does illuminate how nar-
row the options were for the men who sat on the Court in the
era of "Jim Crow." If Brewer found it impossible to embrace the
cause of African-American civil rights in his opinions, then it
should not be surprising that his colleagues, who lacked his abo-
litionist heritage and interest in the race issue, found little prob-
lem with the constitutional standard of separate but equal. In
this light, the racial egalitarianism of John Marshall Harlan is
even more remarkable.
Ironically, Brewer's most important legacy in the realm of
civil rights was the ambivalent character of his opinions and the
scrupulous way in which he avoided addressing the question of
race directly. At a time when "scientific" theories of negro infer-
iority had their greatest popular acceptance, and the reasonable-
ness of racial separation seemed least controversial, it was possi-
ble that the Court could have elected to read contemporary
white racial views directly into the Constitution in much the
same manner that it did with the then fashionable economic
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doctrines of liberty of contract and substantive due process.
There were more than hints of this in the Plessy opinion-a
decison that Brewer never cited in any of his opinions involving
civil rights.1"5 For Brewer, however, the proper response was not
an endorsement of white racial superiority or of the natural in-
compatibility of the races, nor a reiteration of the Plessy holding
that reasonable racial distinctions could withstand constitutional
challenge. Rather, Brewer adopted the position that the Court
need not directly address the issue of what rights the Constitu-
tion guaranteed to African-Americans.
In his Berea College dissent, Justice Harlan demanded to
know:
Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race that an
American government, professedly based on the principles of
freedom, and charged with the protection of all citizens alike,
can make distinctions between such citizens in the matter of
their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes simply because
of their respective races?17 6
Unfortunately, the contemporary answer to Harlan's question
was "yes." Although the question clearly troubled Brewer, he
could not, like Harlan, bring himself to answer in the negative.
In his mind, African-Americans would simply have to wait until
the time was right for them to participate fully as American citi-
zens. However, contrary to many of his white contemporaries, he
did at least believe that such a time would come.
In the meantime, the best that Brewer could do was to
avoid writing the legitimacy of racial distinctions directly into
the body of American constitutional law. By pretending repeat-
edly that the issue before the Court was not one of race, however
disingenuous the assertion may have been, Brewer at least
avoided having to answer Harlan's question in the affirmative,
and when the Court's attitudes toward the rights of African-
'" See C. LOFGREN, supra note 1, at 51; Miller, Constitutional Law and the Rheto-
ric of Race, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 147, 170-71 (B. Bailyn & D. Fleming eds. 1971).
"" Berea College, 211 U.S. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Americans did finally change, Brewer's opinions posed no real
obstacle to the implementation of a nxore racially egalitarian
constitutional vision.
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